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Facebook has been a key site for the propagation of junk news, 
content that Liotsiou et al. (2019) define as publications that 
present themselves as news sites, but do not adhere to journal-
istic norms and ethics, and instead select, frame, and distort 
evidence to suit their political agenda. While the term itself 
does not imply a specific political ideology and manifestations 
exist on both sides of the aisle, empirical research suggests 
that that junk news is predominantly a right-wing phenome-
non, and often ideologically extreme (Liotsiou et al., 2019; see 
also Pierri et al., 2020). Junk news have caused concern as 
they have been associated with challenges to democratic dis-
course and the upsurge of far-right populist, conservative, and 
nationalist movements (cf. Pierri et al., 2020). It is also a phe-
nomenon intimately linked with social media’s attention econ-
omy and its mechanics of information circulation (Venturini, 
2019). Social media’s affordances increasingly comprise 
interactive, “emotional architectures” that encourage emo-
tional signaling and evolve in response to it (Wahl-Jorgensen, 
2019). Junk news seem both native to and exploitative of this 
context: they mobilize “attention-grabbing techniques” and 
are characterized by their affective style: they often contain 
emotionally driven language, emotive expressions, hyperbole, 
and inflammatory viewpoints (Liotsiou et al., 2019, p. 3).
Junk news engagement on Facebook exemplifies the 
entwinement of the political, emotional, and the technologi-
cal. Yet, details of the emotional reactions and “affective 
meaning-making” (Wetherell, 2012) found that such content 
triggers on social media are still poorly understood. Why? 
Alice Marwick (2018) argues that social researchers have 
imagined social media audiences of political junk news 
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Abstract
How do audiences make sense of and interact with political junk news on Facebook? How does the platform’s “emotional 
architecture” intervene in these sense-making, interactive processes? What kinds of mediated publics emerge on and through 
Facebook as a result? We study these questions through topic modeling 40,500 junk news articles, quantitatively analyzing 
their engagement metrics, and a qualitative comment analysis. This exploratory research design allows us to move between 
levels of public discourse, zooming in from cross-outlet talking points to microsociological processes of meaning-making, 
interaction, and emotional entrainment taking place within the comment boxes themselves. We propose the concepts of 
delighting and detesting engagement to illustrate how the interplay between audiences, platform architecture, and political 
junk news generates a bivalent emotional dynamic that routinely divides posts into highly “loved” and highly “angering.” We 
argue that high-performing (or in everyday parlance, viral) junk news bring otherwise disparate audience members together 
and orient their dramatic focus toward objects of collective joy, anger, or concern. In this context, the nature of political junk 
news is performative as they become resources for emotional signaling and the construction of group identity and shared 
feeling on social media. The emotions that animate junk news audiences typically refer back to a transpiring social relationship 
between two political sides. This affectively loaded “us” versus “them” dynamic is both enforced by Facebook’s emotional 
architecture and made use of by junk news publishers.
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predominantly as “cultural dupes”—a stance which renders 
the issue of how political junk news land among them a non-
question. Yet, we hold that knowledge about how problematic 
right-wing content is received in practice and made sense of 
by empirical audiences is important if we wish to grasp the 
cultural, political, and affective impulses behind its consump-
tion. Moreover, and as suggested, we must also consider how 
Facebook’s emotional architecture intervenes in and frames 
user engagement. As we illustrate, Facebook’s affordances 
and algorithms shape the expressions and conversations tak-
ing place among junk news audiences. They direct audiences’ 
dramatic focus and organize conversations along emotional 
lines, as well as encourage some emotive expressions over 
others. If, as Papacharissi (2016, p. 4) suggests, the “textual 
rendering” of audiences qua publics (cf. Livingstone, 2005) is 
part of their very becoming—in a circular fashion informing 
their self-image and trajectory—then understanding how 
social media’s emotional infrastructures intervene in this pro-
cess becomes paramount.
In this article, we target the operation of emotion among 
audiences of right-wing junk news with the concepts of 
delighting and detesting engagement, understood as products 
of users’ interactions with and around news stories on a social 
media platform that encourages emotional signaling of certain 
types and evolves in response to it. The concepts emerged 
from a computational-qualitative analysis of how audiences 
respond to right-wing junk news on social media. More spe-
cifically, we topic-modeled a dataset of over 40,000 articles 
that were posted to Facebook by over 20 US junk news sources 
in Spring 2019. Topic modeling made it possibly to identify, 
based on our data, wider issues, and thematics that were salient 
in far-right-wing media at the time. We then studied the “reac-
tions” the posts had received on Facebook, of which there are 
six types: like, love, haha, wow, sad, and angry. We discovered 
that the interplay between junk news (producers), audiences, 
and Facebook’s emotional architecture generates a bivalent 
emotional logic: “love” and “angry” reactions rarely co-
occurred, and correlated most strongly with different other 
reactions. To explore this emotional logic further, we con-
ducted qualitative comment analysis of high-performing1 
posts that had been either positively or negatively received. 
Current discussions on the emotional dimension of political 
disinformation tend to focus exclusively on how it ignites neg-
ative feelings, like outrage and hate (cf. Bakir & McStay, 
2018; Clark & Zhang, 2018; Keener, 2018; Onge, 2018). In 
contrast, our study highlights the complementary role of buoy-
ant expressions and positive self-imagining—enabled in part 
by Facebook’s “pro-social” affordances—in powering the far-
right-wing digital media ecosystem.
As “news” spread through sharing and algorithmic pro-
motion, they aggregate emotive responses that become part 
of the “news” itself. Delighting and detesting engagement 
not only illustrate how Facebook’s emotional affordances 
figure in the interaction between junk news (producers) and 
their audiences, but also make room for interrogating the 
emotional work that algorithmically promoted engagement 
performs. Bursts of affectively valenced mass engagement 
bring audience members together and open up moments to 
express and negotiate emotion, and moral and social bound-
aries. Based on our analysis, we argue that the nature of 
political junk news is performative as they become resources 
for emotional signaling and the construction of group iden-
tity and shared feeling on social media. We suggest that fun-
damentally, delighting and detesting engagement have less to 
do with the contents of any single news article per se, and 
more with an evolving and agitated relationship between dif-
ferent political sides—an antagonism junk news feeds from 
and reinforces. Mass engagement does not, then, merely rep-
resent pre-constituted audience sentiment, but as we argue, 
mediates and intensifies it. Before moving on to lay out our 
data, methods, and analysis in the next section, we draw 
together lines of argument that are needed to define delight-
ing and detesting engagement beyond an empirical pattern, 
and give them theoretical depth.
Delighting and Detesting Engagement
Delighting and detesting engagement testifies to how plat-
form architecture and emotions come together, engendering 
mediated publics through inscriptive processes. We analyze 
this phenomenon through the forcings of platform architec-
ture, relational emotions, and audiences becoming publics. 
The collectivities called into being by social media are 
shaped not only by their shared social characteristics, but 
also by the properties of the digital architectures that enable 
their emergence (boyd, 2010). They organize information 
circulation and enable and constrain users’ interactive behav-
iors in platform-specific ways (boyd, 2010). As observed by 
Wahl-Jorgensen (2019), these architectures are increasingly 
“emotional.” Facebook, the context of our study, is an exam-
ple of what some call “affective computing” (cf. Kleber, 
2018). In 2016, the company introduced “reactions”: an 
“extension of the Like Button” intended to be used “to 
express how you feel” (Facebook Brand Resources, 2020). 
Facebook’s affordances not only encourage emotional 
responses, but also algorithmically promote emotionally 
engaging content. These two technical characteristics are 
critical in terms of generating delighting and detesting 
engagement, understood as products of users’ interactions 
with and around junk news on a platform that encourages 
emotional signaling and evolves in response to it.
Next, there is the question of emotion. What, exactly, is the 
nature of the emotional processes that underpin delighting 
and detesting engagement? Much influential work on affect 
study it as direct, somatic responses that “by-pass subjectiv-
ity” (Protevi, 2009, p. 9; Thrift, 2008). Yet, it seems to us that 
the most fruitful sociological questions regarding emotion 
and affect have to do precisely with the ways in which emo-
tions register not as physiological or preconscious intensities, 
but as culturally recognizable practices and performances 
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(Wetherell, 2012); how they figure in discursive meaning-
making (Wetherell, 2012); and how they are not autonomous 
or unpredictable, but structured and patterned in ways that 
reflect the social arrangements and relationships from within 
which they emerge (Wetherell, 2012; see also Burkitt, 2014). 
In our quest to conceptualize affective online engagement 
with junk news beyond irrational reactivity or suggestibil-
ity—often posited in post-truth discourse as the driving force 
behind disinformation consumption (cf. Durnová, 2019)—we 
approach emotional responses to Facebook posts as self-con-
scious expressions performed to others through the use of the 
semiotic resources afforded by the platform, and oriented 
toward the actions and interpretations of other users. Users 
express their emotions from culturally recognizable “affec-
tive subject positions” that are relational in that they “are 
responsive to what has gone before, and are often loosely 
paired with each other” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 86). From this 
relational perspective, we draw attention to how mediated 
emotion is not inherent to the individual, but achieved in 
interaction as users jointly and continuously create contexts 
for each other’s feeling and expression (Burkitt, 2014; 
Wetherell, 2012).
The third tier of our theoretical argument concerns junk 
news audiences themselves. What are they? Where are they? 
How do they change as a result of delighting and detesting 
engagement? The concepts of “audience” and “public” are 
sometimes collapsed, yet generally, the former tends to 
emphasize spectatorship, whereas the latter a shared orienta-
tion (Livingstone, 2005). Based on our analysis, we argue 
that viral engagement surfaces audiences qua publics. 
Delighting and detesting engagement bring otherwise dispa-
rate audience members together and direct their dramatic 
focus toward objects of collective concern, anger or joy. 
While the attention expanded by singular audience members 
may be fleeting, they often enough leaves traces in the form 
of a response, which rapidly accumulate and spur further 
interactions. As Papacharissi (2016) argues, the being of 
mediated publics is inscriptive: they “become what they are 
and simultaneously ‘a record or trace’ of what they are” (p. 
610). They may not have an existence independent of their 
“textual rendering” (Papacharissi, 2016) on social media—
yet they still have performative effects. The same applies to 
delighting and detesting engagement. As platform-mediated 
emotions, they constitute of circulating, affectively valenced 
inscriptions that orient meaning-making and generate politi-
cal discourse. They carry over time and space, indicating the 
mediated public’s changing contours and communicating its 
constitution, claims, and tenor to participants and onlookers 
alike.
Operationalization, Data, and Methods
The Concept of Junk News
As defined in the works of Liotsiou et al. (2019), Bolsover 
and Howard (2018), and Howard et al. (2018), the term “junk 
news” refers to various forms of propaganda and ideologi-
cally extreme, hyper-partisan, or conspiratorial political 
news and information. The term includes news publications 
that present verifiably false content as factual news, and also 
covers propagandistic, ideologically extreme, hyper-parti-
san, or conspiracy-oriented news and information, or com-
mentary that is presented as news. The term refers to a news 
source overall, that is, it is based on the content that is typi-
cally published by a source, rather than referring to an indi-
vidual article. Liotsiou et al. (2019) use five criteria 
to identify junk news sources. If a website satisfied the 
majority, that is, three or more, of these five criteria, it was 
considered a source of junk news. These five criteria are: 
professionalism, style, bias (left-wing or right-wing), and 
counterfeit. Full descriptions of each criterion can be found 
in Table 1 of Liotsiou et al. (2019).
Data Collection and Modifications
Between 4 February 2019 and 17 April 2019, we retrieved the 
URLs and Facebook URLs of approximately 48,000 junk 
news articles from the Junk News Aggregator (from now on 
JNA), a public project by the Oxford Internet Institute 
(Liotsiou et al., 2019), in combination with scraping their 
original URLs to extract the articles’ titles and text bodies. At 
the time of our data collection, the JNA aggregated URLs and 
Facebook URLs of articles posted to Facebook by 50 US junk 
news sources, selected based on the above operationalization 
of the term junk news (for more information on the sampling 
methodology, see Liotsiou et al., 2019). We limited ourselves 
to the 35 publishers that posted actively to Facebook in 
November 2018 when we initiated our research project and 
started developing the scrapers. In addition, we extracted the 
engagement metrics of the Facebook posts linking to the 
scraped articles. We opted for scraping, because Facebook’s 
free Graph API returns only the sum total of different reac-
tions. Moreover, manually comparing the Facebook posts to 
reaction counts acquired via the Graph API and by web scrap-
ing revealed that while the scraped data matched what was 
publicly visible on Facebook, engagement data acquired via 
the API did not. Scraping was therefore both a more accessi-
ble and reliable method of data collection. As Mancosu and 
Vegetti (2020) note, scraping public, not personally identifi-
able information like aggregate engagement metrics is both 
ethically and legally acceptable for researchers. Moreover, 
because the information was publicly available, extracting it 
was possible without subscribing to Facebook’s TOS that 
imposes scraping restrictions (Mancosu & Vegetti, 2020, p. 6; 
see also Beurskens, 2013). The metrics we scraped comprise 
the number of shares and comments on one hand, and reac-
tions on the other. Facebook only displays the three most 
common reactions for a post, which illustrates the predomi-
nant emotional response, enabled by Facebook’s affordances, 
a post has received. We acquired the engagement metrics with 
a time lag of above 3 days, after which news engagement on 
4 Social Media + Society
Facebook drastically decreases/practically stops (Castillo 
et al., 2014, p. 90).
Before moving on to data exploration and analysis, we 
deleted duplicates and did quality checks on the data. We 
took random samples to double-check for any “dirty” data 
(e.g., excess HTML tags), and preprocessed the data accord-
ingly. At this point, we excluded 7,526 articles that had little 
to no text (less than 100 words) from the final dataset; 7,035 
of them originated from one highly prolific publisher that 
was then excluded from the analysis. These articles con-
tained typically either an embedded YouTube video with no 
text at all or a very short description. Audiovisual content fell 
outside of the methodological scope of our paper, an impor-
tant part of which was topic modeling, a text-based method 
(see the “Topic Modeling” section). After training the topic 
model, we ruled out some news sources from the analysis of 
Facebook reactions. First, we excluded Shareblue and Raw 
Story, the only left-wing outlets in our dataset, as we were 
interested in the affective positioning of right-wing junk 
news’ audiences. However, we excluded Shareblue and Raw 
Story only after training the topic model, because right-wing 
disinformation is not confined to the far-right media ecosys-
tem (Venturini, 2019). Comparisons showed that the topic 
model did not change meaningfully whether left-wing 
sources were included or not, likely because their posts com-
prised a small minority (n = 2,191 or .05%) of the total data-
set. We thus opted for mapping the whole topical space. At 
the same time, we also factored out articles published by 
David Harris JR (n = 775), Daily Caller (n = 2,364), and 
NWOReport (n = 1,586), whose Facebook posts’ engage-
ment metrics we were unable to acquire (the posts were no 
longer available on Facebook, so they had likely been 
deleted). The final dataset for exploring Facebook reactions 
contained 31,729 articles and 29 publishers.
Topic Modeling
We used latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) to learn, from our 
data, some of the central talking points of far-right-wing 
media in the Spring of 2019. LDA, a form of topic modeling, 
is an unsupervised text analysis technique to inductively 
explore semantic patterns in a large corpus of documents. 
The output consists of word clusters called topics. Instead of 
being assigned to only one topic, documents are defined as 
distributions of topics based on the words (in our case, both 
uni- and bigrams) they contain.
Topic modeling is an iterative process, where different 
ways of preprocessing data (e.g., lemmatizing, stemming) 
and parameter values—for example, number of topics, thresh-
olds for filtering out common, or uncommon words—are 
assessed first and foremost in relation to the pragmatic value 
of the model. In other words, parameters are “evaluated using 
more qualitative methods, according to whether they generate 
meaningful and analytically useful topics” (A. Törnberg & 
Törnberg, 2016, p. 407). In our case, after experimenting with 
different parameter values for the number of topics (k = 10, 
k = 30, k = 50, and k = 100), and carefully examining the mod-
el’s output, we settled on a topic number of 30. The hyper-
parameters alpha and eta were set at = 1/k. We filtered out 
words that appeared in less than 10 documents and in more 
than half of all the documents. We did not use stemming or 
lemmatizing, as they did not improve the model.
It is not atypical that even in topic modeling solutions that 
yield the most practically valuable outputs, some to many of 
the topics the algorithm retrieves are either not useful from 
the perspective of the research question (A. Törnberg & 
Törnberg, 2016, p. 411) or cannot be given an interpretation 
to, and are therefore discarded from further analysis. In our 
case, using a topic number of k = 30 gave enough granularity 
to enable us to identify seven topics that could be given an 
interpretation to as representing a distinct talking point in the 
far-right-wing media sphere in the early Spring of 2019. For 
each topic, we took 20 top documents (i.e., articles that were 
the most distinctive of each topic based on their word distri-
bution), and explored them manually to fully interpret the 
meaning of the topic.
The topics were: border security; reproductive rights, gun 
control, progressive congresswoman Alexandra-Ocasio 
Cortez and her climate proposal Green New Deal, accusa-
tions of anti-semitism against progressive congresswoman 
Ilhan Omar, the Mueller investigation on Trump’s potential 
collusion with Russia, and finally, black gay actor Jussie 
Smollett, who in January 2019 reported having been physi-
cally attacked by two Trump supporters shouting homopho-
bic and racist slurs at him. The incident spurred public 
concerns about the normalization of bigotry after the presi-
dential election of Donald Trump. Later, the hate crime was 
found to be staged by Smollett himself, causing media frenzy 
and a criminal investigation. As these seven topics do not 
cover all of the dataset, but only a portion of it, we are not 
claiming to provide a complete depiction of the far-right-
wing media discussion in the Spring of 2019. Rather, our use 
of topic modeling winnowed out distinct talking points that 
appeared across a number of more or less established far-
right-wing news outlets, and that we could then concentrate 
on—examining audiences’ emotional meaning-making vis-
à-vis them.
Zooming into Outliers
In the final stage of the analysis, we blend quantitative and 
qualitative methods, using digital data not to find linear 
dependencies (which indeed may be impossible due to the 
nonlinear characteristic of social media networks (P. 
Törnberg, 2018, p. 1), but to “juxtapose, contrast and find 
revealing outliers” (Savage, 2013, p. 17). We first assigned 
documents into mutually exclusive topic categories based 
on topic scores, which we inferred from each document’s 
topic distribution. For example, in order to be assigned to 
topic category A, the document had to have the highest topic 
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score for topic A, and this score had to be above 20. The 
threshold value of 20 was based on extensive manual data 
exploration, which concluded that a lower or a higher 
threshold would result in a larger amount of false-positives 
or -negatives, respectively. For the seven identified topic 
categories presented above, the number of documents per 
topic was: borders (n = 1,104) the Mueller investigation 
(n = 278), abortion (n = 2,017), Jussie Smollett’s hate crime 
hoax (n = 711), gun control (n = 415), Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez and the Green New Deal (n = 1,117), and Ilhan Omar 
(n = 765). After obtaining the documents, for each above-
mentioned topic category, we compared the 20 posts with 
the most “angry” reactions to the 20 posts with the most 
“love” reactions. Our reasons for choosing the love and 
angry reactions/affordances for sampling cases for qualita-
tive analysis were twofold. First, they were relatively com-
mon and their meanings are clear and opposing. Second, and 
most importantly, we found that “love” and “angry” reac-
tions not only rarely co-occurred, but also correlated with 
different other reactions, which we will come to in more 
detail in the next section.
We not only read the texts of the articles the Facebook posts 
linked to, but also analyzed the Facebook posts’ comments 
sections. We used a grounded approach whereby analysis is 
guided by researchers’ prior knowledge, yet is open-ended, 
iterative, and reflexive in nature (Thornberg, 2012). Patterns 
found from the data are theoretically reflected upon, and guide 
further analysis and concept elaboration (Thornberg, 2012). 
Due to data protection reasons, we chose not to retrieve the 
comments and save them. Instead, we followed the links (orig-
inally retrieved from the JNA) to the actual, public Facebook 
posts, and carried out the analysis by carefully reading their 
comment sections and simultaneously making extensive notes 
on the emotions people expressed, the values, beliefs, and 
lines of reasoning that underlay their positive or negative emo-
tional responses, as well as on the interchanges and negotia-
tions between users regarding appropriate emotional response 
and feeling. The qualitative analysis was intensive and took 
several weeks, during which we got to know the data closely. 
Based on assessing the behavior of the commenters, we did 
not detect bots. However, we are aware that we cannot know 
the real identities and intentions of the commenters. We do not 
consider this a major issue, though, because we are primarily 
interested in the “textual rendering” of junk news audiences on 
Facebook, to use Papacharissi’s (2016, p. 14) wording—not, 
for example, their demographic composition. Furthermore, we 
focus on comments evaluated by other (emic) members of the 
audience as valid, receiving endorsements and sparking fur-
ther interactions.
Because the analysis focused on articles that were high 
performing and could have thousands of comments, we ana-
lyzed only a subset of comments for each article, reading the 
comment section, and taking notes until the data began to 
saturate (approximately 100 comments). It is important to 
note that Facebook provides three options for viewing 
comments, which structure what one does and does not see, 
and thus render the audience in different ways. These are: 
“most relevant” (i.e., comments that are the most “engaging” 
or originate from profiles with the “verified” badge), “all 
comments” (shows all comments, yet in the order of their 
aforementioned “relevance”), and “newest” comments. We 
used the “all comments” option for carrying out the analysis. 
It does not filter out comments, yet comes close to how an 
everyday user browsing Facebook on default-mode would 
encounter them. We also found that the comments marked 
“relevant” by the Facebook algorithm typically provided 
richest data for qualitative analysis: they were typically lon-
ger than less “relevant” comments and (had) generated fur-
ther affective interactions. The comments that are featured in 
the following analysis have been anonymized by concealing 
the profile name. They are provided as examples of emo-
tional and interactive patterns that emerged from the 
grounded analysis, and illustrate central features of delight-
ing and detesting engagement.
Analysis
Engagement Metrics: Loving and Sharing Junk 
News
Over 30% of the articles in our final dataset had less than 10 
shares or 20 likes, while only a handful of posts had over 
40,000 of either. While this kind of “long tail” is typical for 
social media engagement in general, it is usually overlooked 
in discussions on junk news, which tend to center the highly 
“popular” and spreading (cf. Venturini, 2019). The stagger-
ing quantity of low-performing content (see Figure 1) focuses 
attention to the struggle of producing media texts that gener-
ate engagement in digital networks that are flooded with 
information. In this context, high-performing junk news 
stand out. They bring together otherwise disparate users, 
directing their dramatic focus.
Exploring the different types of Facebook reactions 
against each other, a nuanced image of engagement emerges. 
Even with the limited affordances users have to express their 
Figure 1. Distribution of shares across the dataset (zoomed).
6 Social Media + Society
emotional response, there is observable dispersion. Generally, 
“angrys” seem to co-occur predominately with “sads” and 
“wows,” whereas the relationship between “loving” and “lik-
ing” content is highly positive (Figure 2). Meanwhile, 
“loves” and “angrys” are most strongly associated with dif-
ferent other reactions. This suggests the division of Facebook 
posts into positively and negatively received that we study 
qualitatively in the following sections and argue is character-
istic for junk news engagement.
Topic Modeling: Emerging Themes
Topic modeling enabled us to tease out wider subject matters 
and talking points that were highly politicized and got sus-
tained attention across far-right-wing outlets during the time 
of our data collection. To reiterate, the topics we identified 
were: reproductive rights, gun control, Alexandra Ocasio-
Cortez the Green New Deal, accusations of anti-semitism 
against Ilhan Omar, the Mueller investigation, and actor 
Jussie Smollett’s alleged hate crime hoax. We are not inter-
ested in these topics in and of themselves but rather in how 
audiences related to and made sense of them, and what kind 
of cultural and emotional work they performed among audi-
ences. Therefore, we do not describe the topics here in detail, 
but have weaved in relevant information about them with the 
qualitative comment analysis. Furthermore, we discovered 
that there were many commonalities in how audiences 
responded to highly “loved” and highly “angering” articles 
that were about different topics. Thus, instead of describing 
the audience response to each topic separately, we rather 
focus on these emergent themes, dynamics, and types of 
interaction. The topics are, however, still highly relevant for 
our analysis. For a public to emerge, feelings must be ori-
ented toward an object or a target that calls for collective 
action and expression (see also Ahmed, 2014, p. 227).
It is noteworthy that the topics dealt with talking points and 
issues that are known to be divisive along partisan lines, like 
gun control or abortion (cf. Clary & Helmstetter, 2019; North, 
2019). Moreover, Donald Trump’s promised border 
wall—which many of the articles on border security were 
about—was one of the cornerstones of his presidential cam-
paign. It is almost uniformly resisted by the Democrats. The 
Mueller investigation made many Republicans even less likely 
to support the impeachment of Donald Trump (Resto-Montero, 
2019). The effect was the opposite among Democrats—who 
were more likely to support impeachment to begin with 
(Resto-Montero, 2019). As we will show, due to their divisive 
nature, the topics provided a hotbed for delighting and detest-
ing engagement, enabling junk news audiences’ to publicly 
display which side of the partisan divide they were on through 
expressing either exhilaration or indignation vis-à-vis “hap-
pening issues” (Marres, 2015). For example, among the most 
“loved” posts on border control were articles titled such as 
Trump Will Sign Border Bill, Declare National Emergency and 
Trump Plans To Get Even Tougher On Illegal Immigration. In 
contrast, articles titled such as Illegal Alien Accused of 
Repeatedly Raping 15-Year-Old Girl in Kentucky and NYC to 
Allot Extra $1.6M to Lawyers of Illegal Aliens Facing 
Deportation were featured in posts that had gotten the highest 
amount of angry reactions. Note how these articles gain a spe-
cific, politically effective meaning only in relation to one 
another: Democrats favoring dangerous and undeserving ille-
gal immigrants, Trump fighting back for “real” America. This 
insight points to the insufficiency of a singular news story as a 
unit of analysis when it comes to understanding the dramatic 
effect of junk news. Our sampling, based on topic modeling on 
one hand, loving and angry audience responses on the other, 
teases out right-wing junk news’ “portrayal of the contending 
forces in the world” (Carey, 2009, p. 16) and users’ participa-
tion as engrossed, implicated, and devoted observers. In the 
next sections, we will delve into these dynamics qualitatively.
Detesting Engagement
The actively lived and felt dimension of values and ideol-
ogy came to light in users’ emotional–evaluative utterances. 
Detesting engagement accumulated expressions of anger, 
disappointment, moral indignation, sadness, and urgency. 
Because emotions are inherent to the act of evaluation, they 
play their part in political and moral reasoning (Burkitt, 
2014). Posts that referred to Democrats who had allegedly 
crossed a moral boundary were effective at generating 
detesting engagement. For example, a detested post on 
abortion linked to an article titled: Elizabeth Warren com-
pares abortion to “Getting your tonsils out.” (Here, 
Warren’s words are twisted: she has said in a Senate floor 
speech that “abortions are safer than getting your tonsils 
out” (Senator Elizabeth Warren, 2018)). This kind of expo-
sure was effective at weakening trust and increasing cyni-
cism as it hampered not only the social standing of the 
public figure under scrutiny, but by association also the 
legitimacy of the values, groups, and institutions they were 
seen to represent (see Adut, 2005, pp. 219–220). The rela-
tively common #WalkAway hashtag used by the commenter 
in Figure 3, targeted to Democrats “ready to leave their 
Figure 2. Heat map visualizing correlations between different 
Facebook reactions.
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party,” illustrates both the relational quality of emotion and 
its directional orientation (Ahmed, 2014, pp. 25, 209). 
Detesting engagement indicated movement away from 
those who, or that which, was experienced as disappoint-
ing, wrong, or hurtful:
Collective emotion does not pre-exist communication, but 
is a continuous and fragile achievement, created in and 
through social interaction (Burkitt, 2014; Wetherell, 2012). 
For example, one’s interlocutors can either sympathize with 
one’s anger or ridicule it as unjustified. Among junk news 
audiences, emotions were rendered characteristics of the 
group first and foremost through emotional expressions that 
could be endorsed by other users. The wide range of tonali-
ties and affective practices we observed for any single 
story—from cynical detachment to heartfelt grief or know-
ing irony—points to the fact that while political disinforma-
tion undoubtedly affects its readers, it does not operate 
through emotional contagion, or by transmitting a feeling all 
readers would experience identically. Yet, the most appealing 
expressions of an emotional self were rewarded by fellow 
audience members with empathic reactions and praise, mak-
ing them seem more legitimate than others. Expressing the 
correct emotional state, or claiming a morally righteous 
affective position could grant one social status in the eyes of 
others (see Figure 4, which has gotten above 1,000 endorse-
ments in the form of likes, “loves,” and “sads” that signal 
sympathy). Such comments got further visibility and legiti-
macy as they were algorithmically ranked as “relevant” and 
displayed right below the post itself, creating a feedback 
loop of positive engagement. Meanwhile, comments with 
fewer reactions sank to obscurity. Algorithms thus took part 
in the interaction/conversation itself, affecting its framings, 
trajectory, and emphases.
At the same time, emotional rejection rendered one’s 
belonging in the group suspect. Although, as Aistrope (2019) 
notes, “moments of affective dissonance mark sites of resis-
tance and openings for critical engagement” (p. 19), these 
openings were short-lived as users who did not express emo-
tional resonance with the news or with their peers were either 
rejected or ignored. By displaying side-by-side comments that 
had received the most endorsements on one hand and the most 
pushback on the other, Facebook’s emotional architecture 
indicated how audience members ought to feel about a post or 
a topic in order to belong. An illustrative example takes place 
as one user remarks that an article on abortion, presented as 
breaking news, is in fact multiple months old. “So what? 
Doesn’t make it any less disgusting,” goes the somewhat pas-
sive-aggressive reply—that had gotten further endorsements 
in the form of love reactions. In line with the populist episte-
mology that prioritizes experience over journalistic integrity, 
what we find here is political identity manifested as an 
“authentic”—and therefore irrefutable—emotional–evalua-
tive response, which simultaneously casts “them” as amoral 
and “us” as having our hearts in the right place. A key element 
of belonging therefore comprised not only of one’s self-pro-
claimed position on the political spectrum, but also of one’s 
emotional response to events presented by junk news. 
Complaining about journalistic standards signaled that one 
had lost their dramatic focus.
Delighting Engagement
Positive sentiments played their role in powering the disinfor-
mation ecosystem. Conservative politicians were met with 
delighting engagement. They were praised for safeguarding 
conservative values: for “standing up for righteousness” or 
“having a common sense.” Posts that reported on the far 
right’s “round wins” in the partisanized issues, such as abor-
tion, gun control, the US–Mexico border wall or the Mueller 
investigation gave rise to feelings of victory, hope, pride, and 
solidarity. The intertext of sports was present in both the posts 
and the comment boxes. For example, see the image of 
Trump’s body language and the audience cheering for him 
after he had, according to far-right-wing media, “defeated” 
Democrats who had accused him of foul play (Figure 5). 
Comments in Figures 6 and 7 cheer Trump’s success. The 
intertext of sports is potent: it evokes affective practices that 
Figure 3. Part of a Facebook post.
Figure 4. Moral indignation. A comment on a post on 
progressive pro-choice congresswomen.
Figure 5. Alleged exoneration and the sports intertext.
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engage the whole body of readers who feel both “the dismay 
of defeat” and the “exhilaration of victory” as they root for 
their team (Aistrope, 2019, p. 8). They are affected because of 
their devotion to the game: they have stakes in it; it makes a 
difference to them. Indeed, much like ardent sports fans, 
expressive partisans—that is, those who have internalized a 
partisan identity—experience their party’s victories as well as 
failures personally and emotionally (Huddy et al., 2015).
Seemingly saddening news could give rise to a joyous 
response. Many of the most “loved” articles on the topic of 
gun control dealt with cases where someone had been 
killed. Upon closer inspection, these were situations where 
an everyday citizen had shot an alleged perpetrator in 
defense of themselves, their loved ones or their property 
(e.g., Suspects Allegedly Point Gun at Woman’s Head, Get 
Shot Dead). Incidents like these provided audiences with 
stories that affirmed their conservative ideology; ones that 
they could mobilize in a real or imagined debate on firearm 
regulation (Figures 8 to 10). That junk news provided far-
right-wing audiences with information that affirmed their 
beliefs was interpreted as a sign of solidarity from the pub-
lishers’ part. Meanwhile, the mainstream media not report-
ing on such events was seen as a sign of their bias, and 
further solidified one’s trust in junk news. The interactivity 
of Facebook’s algorithms in assembling not only enraging, 
but also indeed pleasurable encounters with information is 
made explicit by the comment in Figure 10. Affirmative 
stories effectively brought audience members together, 
reminding them of the ideals and values that bind them 
(like individual liberty), and thus enabling them to explore 
and articulate the “positive” dimension of their identifica-
tion: not just what they were fighting against, but also what 
they were fighting for.
Audiences likewise adored seeing members of the oppo-
site political side condemned and ridiculed (see reactions to 
comment in Figure 11). For example, the most-loved articles 
on AOC were often about public smears against her, such as: 
James Woods Rips ““Arrogant Idiot” Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez: “You Work for Us,” “Greenpeace Founder Calls Rep. 
Ocasio-Cortez ‘Pompous Little Twit.’” Posts about young, 
progressive women of color Representatives Ocasio-Cortez 
and Omar received perhaps the most hate and name-calling, 
evoking expressions of revulsion, and even danger and 
“invasion” (see Figure 12).
How to understand the seemingly paradoxical intertwin-
ing of malice with affection that characterized the conversa-
tions under study? The self-romanticization, feelings of 
belonging, and joy that right-wing junk news audiences 
articulated were typically predicated on exclusion and reac-
tionary negativity. The affective practices of love and soli-
darity, on one hand, and hate and othering on the other, are 
thus interrelated (see also Ahmed, 2003). This grounding of 
animus in affection—which also functioned as a potent rhe-
torical device—became especially visible as one commenter 
encouraged her peers to “fight back with truths, not more 
name calling and insults.” She was told that it was in fact not 
viciousness, but love of the country and devotion for the 
cause that underlay her peers’ hateful disposition toward the 
out-group (Figure 13).
Figures 6 and 7. Rooting for one’s team.
Figures 8 to 10. “Good guys with guns stop bad guys with guns.”
Figure 11. Positioning oneself vis-à-vis AOC’s left-wing politics.
Figure 12. Politics of disgust.
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Here, meanings, values, and appropriate emotions are 
negotiated and reconfigured in situ. A more “traditional” 
Republican, who associates conservatism with certain man-
ners and a respectable disposition is met with Trumpists for 
whom a hateful and politically incorrect style of talk marks 
devotion and even love. Not feeling similarly indicates not 
thinking similarly—indeed, it means not even agreeing with 
the tactics (Figure 14).
In some domains, both intentional and unintentional 
expressions of racism and sexism are increasingly identified, 
seen as inappropriate and policed. For example, people are 
more aware of the workings of microaggressions or internal-
ized misogyny and understand their negative impact on indi-
viduals and the society overall. Troublingly, the Facebook 
sites of far-right-wing news outlets are pockets where resist-
ing this socially aware mind-set (and the norms and symbols 
that come with it) is accepted and functions even as a status 
symbol and a sign of belonging—hinting at the co-develop-
ment of left- and right-wing “feeling rules” (see also Boler & 
Davis, 2018). This relational, reactive dynamic seemed 
almost like an engine of renewal and evolvement for the dis-
position and vernacular of the mediated far-right (Figure 15):
The relationality of mediated emotions
Far-right media has undoubtedly bolstered attitudes 
regarding the political issues at stake. It has presented exag-
gerated and unfounded threats to the identities, values, and 
lifeworlds of white, Republican Americans. Yet, it is because 
the opposing social force is depicted and experienced as 
unalert to these dangers, or even as endorsing or representing 
them, that they can become politically effective. Therefore, 
to lend the words of Wetherell (2012), research on the poli-
tics of emotion should not begin “with a stimulus or with a 
response, but with the whole social pattern unfolding or 
coming into being” (p. 359). The reference to unfolding 
social pattern points to the mutual constitution of liberal and 
conservative feelings and identities. When the other side 
feels defeat or anger, the other side expresses exhilaration—
and vice versa (see Figure 16). Moreover, far-right-wing 
audiences’ affective subject positions were taken and con-
structed in response to Democrats’ alleged thoughts, actions, 
and expressions. In Figure 17 for instance, the commenter 
cynically distances herself from leftists’ “woke” convictions. 
Meanwhile, the comment in Figure 18—and many others 
like it—implies that Democrats are sore losers, and therefore 
Figure 13. Justifying hate.
Figure 14. “No high road to nowhere anymore”.
Figure 15. Relational self-positioning.
Figure 16. A picture of Rachel Maddow, who covered Mueller 
Report for MSNBC.
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make groundless claims against Donald Trump and his sup-
porters. This narrative works to fill the latter with righteous 
indignation and gives them all the more reason for distrust-
ing the left. What this and the other examples illustrate is that 
affective displays by far-right-wing audiences are not spon-
taneous, irrational outpourings, but more often “socially rec-
ognised routines or affective practices” that refer back to a 
“normative back and forth” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 81) with the 
(mediated) left.
Self-affirmation was a recurring affective practice in both 
delighting and detesting engagement, and was typically car-
ried out through playing back progressive critique or ironi-
cally responding to it. To quote the commenters, it was the left 
that “promoted hate and division” and was “famous for mak-
ing up their own “facts.” The posts on Jussie Smollett in par-
ticular—who had staged a hoax hate crime against himself by 
two men wearing MAGA hats—enabled far-right-wing audi-
ences to claim positions as targets of politically motivated 
accusations, and to articulate feelings of being misrepresented 
and discriminated against (see Figure 19). In what looks like 
photoshopped images, audience members even presented 
themselves as political martyrs, excruciated by the opposing 
side for their devotion to a leader (Figures 20 and 21).
Importantly, this type of rumination was encouraged by 
the publishers. For example, under a post about an article 
titled BREAKING: Jussie Smollett Indicted on 16 Counts in 
Hate Hoax Attack, Breitbart had linked a piece on Celebrities 
who blamed “Trump” and the “deplorables”2 for Smollett’s 
hoax attack on himself. In other words, junk news sources 
made use of the relational constitution of emotion by selec-
tively presenting Trump supporters with allegations liberals 
had made against them. Commenters who took a critical 
view to junk news were written off as Democratic trolls or 
“stupid snowflakes,” embodiments of the opposing political 
side far-right-wing media had spent much time and effort in 
typifying and vilifying. Indeed, the comment boxes were like 
a microcosm within which junk news audiences could repro-
duce and take part in the unfolding drama of contending 
forces that was presented to them in the posts and articles. 
Instead of giving rise to dialogue and self-reflection, each 
real or alleged criticism from the part of a Democratic com-
menter—who were quite common, indicating that this was 
not a wholly homogeneous social environment—seemed to 
polarize junk news audiences even further.
There is always layeredness and irresolution to affective 
experience and interchange. Self-affirmation, for example, 
may carry within it traces of vulnerability or shame (Burkitt, 
2014)—emotions whose expression could perhaps motivate 
more open, and less divisive political discourse. What is at 
stake with detesting and delighting engagement, then, is how 
Figure 17. A comment on a post about (largely unfounded and 
exaggerated) accusations of the supposed anti-semitism of Ilhan 
Omar.
Figure 18. A comment on a story about the Mueller report 
being inconclusive.
Figure 19. Claiming misrepresentation.
Figures 20 and 21. Claiming victimhood as the real object of 
targeting and discrimination.
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through inscriptive and algorithmic processes, certain emo-
tional (mis)interpretations—such as having been unjustly 
treated by the opposing political side—become spread, forti-
fied, and promoted over others. Social media’s emotional 
architecture favors both novelty and repetition: the appetite 
for new content is endless, but this content should be opti-
mized to match users’ preferences as inferred from their past 
behavior. Through algorithmically promoted mass engage-
ment, then, junk news audiences’ attention and sentiment 
become habitually and repetitively channeled in ways that 
enforce social, cultural, and political boundaries, and seem-
ingly make constructive communication across them more 
difficult.
Conclusion
In this article, we have studied how social media’s emotional 
architecture surfaces publics affected by happening issues. 
More specifically, we found that in a bipartisan context, the 
interaction between audiences, affordances, and political con-
tent seems to be effective at generating or catalyzing a biva-
lent emotional dynamic that, broadly speaking, divides posts 
into highly “loved” and highly “angering.” This emotional 
logic is, furthermore, made use of by junk news sources, 
whose reporting systematically afforded users’ positions of 
not only defeat, cynicism, and hate, but also victory, affec-
tion, and self-vindication. Delighting and detesting engage-
ment, then, brought far-right-wing users together and shaped 
their political identification by directing their dramatic focus 
toward both what was loved and what was hated. In the quali-
tative analysis, we have sought to highlight the complexity 
and relationality of mediated political emotions. The expres-
sions of solidarity, care, and delight we encountered entwined 
with distrust and resentment, often presupposing the exclu-
sion of others and taking place at their expense.
Within the comment boxes of high-performing posts, 
affective subject positions were displayed and aggregated, 
with the most appealing ones garnering praise and endorse-
ments. Algorithmically organized encounters with pleasur-
able and enraging content not only moved users, but also 
drew them nearer to those who were similarly moved. 
Meanwhile, affective dissonance rendered one’s belonging 
in the group suspect. The supposedly subversive hyper-parti-
san space was in fact highly self-policed. Challenging junk 
news’ journalistic integrity resulted in social sanctions. Other 
commenters did not disapprove of the content of the criti-
cism per se, but of the very act of critique itself, which sig-
naled that the critic had lost dramatic focus. Fellow feeling 
and a disposition that reveled in—or could at minimum toler-
ate—political or factual incorrectness became requirements 
for inclusion. We found that fundamentally, delighting, and 
detesting engagement boiled down to a transpiring, agitated 
relationship between different political sides: irrespective of 
the topic, the articles were made meaning of within an “us” 
versus “them” framework. In this context, the epistemic 
value of a news story was not a priority. The role of the news 
was performative: information could have emotional reso-
nance or be used for movement-building, fostering solidar-
ity, and signaling identity even if it was unfactual, outdated 
or not representative. It seems, then, that combatting junk 
news must take place not at the level of fact-checking or 
media literacy alone, but through introducing novel narra-
tives and transforming political allegiances.
Our study does not support the assumption, critiqued also 
by Marwick (2018), that the post-truth era and related politi-
cal polarization has to do with audiences being merely pas-
sively exposed to emotionally laden disinformation. Rather, 
on social media, conversations with their distinctive vernac-
ulars and affective practices manifest and propagate. The 
participants of these conversations are largely self-selected, 
and negotiations regarding truth and appropriate emotion 
take place seemingly completely on their own terms—which 
again strengthens these terms and participants’ trust in them. 
However, when analyzing this process, the complementary 
responsiveness of algorithms to users’ interactions with both 
publishers’ content and with each other should also be taken 
into account. Indeed, it seems to us that by encouraging and 
promoting some information and expressions over others, 
Facebook’s architecture influences which emotional defini-
tions of the situation become strengthened and catalyzed, 
and what kind of political discourse gets generated at the 
platform–audience interface. High-performing junk news are 
accompanied by an emotional value—afforded and structur-
ally enforced by social media’s emotional architecture—that 
orients audiences’ attention, affective meaning-making, and 
identification.
As Papacharissi (2016) suggests, the “textual rendering” 
of networked publics is perhaps the primary modality of their 
existence. Nonetheless, studying junk news audiences as and 
through “records and traces” of social media engagement has 
its limits and difficulties. For example, the online conversa-
tions and negotiations about news stories and their meaning 
that we’ve studied on Facebook likely spill over to offline 
contexts, taking place between friends and family, at work or 
over a drink. Addressing how these conversations resemble 
or differ from the ones we have examined—and whether 
they could be less overdetermined, open to more varied 
interpretations and states of being moved—would be an 
interesting question for further study. Moreover, our study 
has focused mainly on analyzing the cultural and emotional 
logic of algorithmically promoted junk news engagement. 
We call for further, more detailed explorations of underlying 
mechanisms, such as the extent to which manufactured sup-
port (e.g., fake accounts) is able to introduce affective and 
interpretative frames into user conversations and contributes 
to crafting the image of the mediated far-right. Another inter-
esting avenue would be to study audience responses to mul-
timedia-centric content. However, even though automated 
image recognition techniques are improving, it is still an 
open question how to analyze social media images and vid-
eos on a large scale in a valid and fine-grained manner. 
Finally, emotions play a role not only in coming together, but 
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also in coming apart. Our dataset does not make visible the 
reasons for, and states of, being affected in ways that made 
former participants want to distance themselves from junk 
news and the mediated far-right. However, those individuals 
undoubtedly exist. Perhaps learning about their experiences 
could help us think how to incite critique toward far-right-
wing disinformation among audiences for whom the very act 
of consuming it is already an act of—however ill-consid-
ered—resistance and self-affirmation.
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Notes
1. With high performing, we mean content that is frequently 
shared and interacted with. In everyday language, this type 
of content is often referred to as “viral,” but scientifically 
speaking, virality also encompasses features that we do not 
study here, such as spread in accordance with certain math-
ematical models. We, therefore, use the more general term 
“high-performing.”
2. The term was initially used by Hillary Clinton to describe the 
most xenophobic, sexist fraction of Trump’s supporters.
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